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This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the 
conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the 
conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept 
of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will 
judgements—judgements regarding whether some action is free or 
not—to be systematically false. Since we do judge many of our 
actions to be free, it follows from the conceptual impossibility thesis 
that many of our actions are in fact free. Hence it follows that free 
will error theory—the view that no judgement of the form ‘action A 
was performed freely’—is false. I will show taking seriously the 
conceptual impossibility thesis helps makes good sense of some 
seemingly inconsistent results in recent experimental philosophy 
work on determinism and our concept of free will. Further, I will 
present some reasons why we should expect to find similar results 
for every other factor we might have thought was important for free 
will. 
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Strictly speaking, transcendental arguments are arguments that attempt to 
show that X is a necessary precondition for the possibility of Y and hence 
since actually Y, therefore actually X. Immanuel Kant (1781/1787) is, of 
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course, the most famous defender of arguments of this kind. We can find 
examples of this kind of argument throughout many different domains of 
philosophy. One recent example involves an objection to certain 
approaches to quantum gravity in the philosophy of time. These 
approaches are said to be timeless, since they deny there exists any ordered 
series of events that are temporally or causally connected to one another. 
However, a necessary precondition to even entertain these theories is 
having contentful mental states. But having contentful mental states 
requires causal connections between at least some of our mental states and 
states in the world those states are about. So, we are only able to entertain 
these theories if in fact they are false (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2018). 
Of course, one response to a transcendental argument is to just deny what 
the proponent takes to be undeniable. For instance, in philosophy of mind, 
a proponent of eliminative materialism, of the kind defended by the 
Churchlands (1981; 1986), can just deny that you need to have beliefs 
(rather than other neuroscientific states) in order to argue that there are no 
beliefs.1 
 
A transcendental argument for free will would proceed by showing that the 
necessary precondition for the possibility of some way things actually 
are—for instance, our being agents, or deliberators, or the kinds of things 
that can ask questions about free will—is there being free will. It then 
follows that since we are such things, there is free will. Robert Lockie 
(2018) does just this in his new book Free Will and Epistemology: If our 
having libertarian free will (free will incompatible with determinism) is a 
necessary precondition for the possibility of our having any justified 
beliefs, then if we believe that we do not have free will, either this belief 
must be unjustified, if it’s true, or if justified, it must be false. In this paper, 
I will run a different line of argument to the conclusion that we have free 
will. Roughly, for now, the idea will be that most of our actions being free 
is a necessary precondition for understanding our ordinary practices as 
being non-defective, and as they are not defective, we have free will. 
 
In this paper, I will argue that our concept of free will cannot do the job it 
is supposed to do, and that concept fail to be satisfied. That’s because most 
of our actions being free is a necessary precondition for understanding our 
ordinary free will practices as being non-defective. These practices involve 
drawing certain kinds of distinctions between different kinds of actions that 
we track with our talk of free and unfree. We distinguish actions performed 
while being coerced, from those performed while fulfilling our desires, and 
actions performed in the grips of a mental illness, from those performed 
after some long effortful deliberation. It’s important to note that what I am 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Kristie Miller for bringing these cases to my attention. 
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intending to pick out in discussing our free will practices is much wider 
than our moral responsibility practices. Consider for a moment certain 
kinds of advertising which push us towards choosing one option over 
another. While these advertisements might impact our behavior in a 
predictable manner, they do so in a way which is not mentally mediated. 
That is, the advertising seems to impact behavior via sub-personal level 
processes which are not consciously available to the deliberator. What is 
important is that the reason we don’t like these kinds of advertising pushes 
is not because we think they undermine our moral responsibility, but 
because they seem to impact our free will in a manner we don’t like. For 
the purposes of this paper I am going to assume we could not engage in 
these practices without making these kinds of distinctions, and further, that 
these practices cannot and should not be revised. The argument for this 
claim about our practices is a job for another paper. Given that these 
practices are not defective, then, I argue, we have free will. It is, as it were, 
conceptually impossible for us to deploy the concept of free will that we 
do, and the world fail to satisfy that concept. 
 
An analogy: one might argue that our concept of ordinary objects such as 
trees, rocks, and so on, are such that even if it turned out that we are living 
in a computer simulation, or some demon’s brain, it will still turn out that 
there are trees and rocks. We might discover that their underlying nature is 
surprising, but not that they don’t exist (Chalmers 2005). If our concept of 
tree was something like: whatever thing it is with which I am causally 
connected, when I have mental states of this kind, then, it would simply 
turn out that if our world is a computer simulation, trees are parts of such 
simulations. What trees are fundamentally made of turns out to be different 
than we originally supposed, but that doesn’t mean there are no trees. 
 
I will argue that it cannot be that we deploy the concept of free will that we 
do, and it turn out that actually we are systematically mistaken about which 
actions are free, and which actions are unfree. Of course, the idea that there 
could be such concepts might seem puzzling, so in §2 I will outline and 
defend the conceptual impossibility thesis. Then in §3 I will show how 
taking seriously the conceptual impossibility thesis reconciles some 
apparent inconsistencies in the extant empirical evidence regarding our 
concept of free will, and determinism. In §4 I will give reasons why we 
should think that the finding that determinism doesn’t matter for our 
having free will, should generalize to other factors people have thought 
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2. The Conceptual Impossibility Thesis 
 
Before I outline the conceptual impossibility thesis in more detail, some 
clarifications are in order. The conceptual impossibility thesis is the thesis 
that given the content of the concept of free will that we, the folk, in fact 
deploy, it cannot be that the concept is systematically misapplied. That is, 
it cannot be that we are systematically mistaken about which actions are 
free and which are unfree. Two things are noteworthy here. First, the 
concept with which I am interested is the folk concept of free will. There 
might be philosophical re-conceptions of free will which have quite 
different content from the folk concept, and I will make no attempt to 
consider such concepts here. Second, the conceptual impossibility thesis is 
a thesis about systematic error. It is not the thesis that none of our 
judgements about which actions are free (or not) are false. It is consistent 
with the conceptual impossibility thesis that some of our judgements about 
which actions are free (or not) are mistaken. 
 
Why would one accept the conceptual impossibility thesis? Let’s call a 
judgement of the form ‘action A is free’ a positive judgement, and a 
judgement of the form ‘action A is unfree’ a negative judgement. I will 
argue that the content of our folk concept is something like the following: 
free will is whatever thing there is in the world which most of our positive 
judgements track. In this regard, I argue that our concept of free will has a 
content, which is such that however our world turns out to be, most of our 
free will judgements (both positive and negative) will be vindicated. The 
only way this could fail to be is if there were nothing at all in common 
between most of the times we judge that an action is free, and most of the 
times we judge that an action is unfree, such that we are not tracking 
anything at all, for there is nothing there to be tracked. But this is clearly 
not the case: there are such similarities. Even free will error theorists don’t 
think that there are no such similarities; they simply think that those 
similarities are not, in fact, sufficient to vindicate our positive free will 
judgements.  
 
But why think that the content of our concept is as I suggest? 
  
Consider the kinds of cases that we ordinarily judge positively to be free, 
and judge negatively to be unfree. Ordinarily, we make positive judgments 
regarding cases where we are act in accordance with our reasons, in 
fulfilling our desires, after having mentally simulated numerous courses of 
actions and their projected outcomes, and so on. Conversely, we make 
negative judgments regarding cases where we are bound-up, or being 
coerced and manipulated, or caught in the grips of a psychological or 
physiological illness, and so on. Of course, neither list is exhaustive of all 
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the kinds cases that we judge positively and negatively. For the moment, I 
simply want to roughly flag the kinds of cases that we ordinarily think of 
as free and unfree.  
 
One way of characterizing the problem of free will is as the worry that 
there is no metaphysical difference between the cases where we judge 
actions to be free, and those we judge to be unfree. That would seem to be 
the case were we to discover that some fact that characterizes those actions 
we currently class as unfree, turns out to be true of all our actions (Dennett 
1984; 2013). For instance, if it turned out that all our actions are coerced, 
or manipulated, or in the grips of psychological or physiological illness, 
then prima facie this would seem to be the discovery that none of our 
actions are free. 
 
Let us focus, for the moment, on one important metaphysical factor 
relevant for free will: determinism. Philosophers have traditionally thought 
that consideration of determinism is important for free will, and so it has 
received the most empirical attention in experimental philosophy. In §3 I 
will turn to the empirical data on the relationship between the folk concept 
of free will and determinism. In §4 I will give some good reasons to think 
that the lessons of the conceptual impossibility thesis generalize to all other 
relevant metaphysical facts as well. 
 
For now, suppose we only judge actions to be free if they are not 
determined. Then indeterminism is necessary for our concept of free will 
to be satisfied, (as is commonly supposed), 2  and if we discover that 
determinism is true, then we discover that there is no free will. Notice, 
though, that if there’s no free will, then all our actions are akin to being 
bound-up, or coerced and manipulated, or caught in the grips of a 
psychological or physiological illness. That, however, seems wrong. Even 
if there is no deep metaphysical difference between the cases, we judge to 
be free, and those we judge to be unfree, we still want our actions to be like 
the ones that we ordinarily think of as free. After all, even if, with respect 
to some particular metaphysical matter of fact, there is no difference 
between these actions, there still seem to be other relevant differences that 
we want to track with our talk of free and unfree action. We want to 
normatively evaluate actions—whether this be moral or prudential 
evaluation—and to do that we want to distinguish actions that are 
performed while being coerced and manipulated, from those that are not, 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Ekstrom (2002), Kane (2005), O’Connor (2000), Pereboom (2001), Pink (2004), 
Strawson (1986), van Inwagen (1993) to name a few. Contra this some theorists such as 
Eddy Nahmias (2011) think the folk concept of concept is a compatibilist one and that 
incompatibilist judgments arise out of people misunderstanding the implications of 
determinism for free will.   
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and actions performed while in the grips of a psychological or 
physiological illness, from those that are not, and so on. Regardless of 
whether determinism is true, we can be expected to care whether our friend 
stood on our foot because, having deliberated about it, she decided this is 
what she wanted to do, and proceeded to do it, or because she was pushed 
over by the person next to her. Mutatis mutandis for all these kinds of 
cases.  
 
So there seems to be a concept of free will that tracks superficial 
differences between the cases we judge to be free, and the cases we judge 
to be unfree. For ease of explication I will call this a social kind concept. 
 
One might, however, object. Consider for the moment a potentially 
analogous case involving water and ice. According to the story I have 
provided so far there are two different social concepts. The social concept 
of water, which is sensitive to the stuff that fills the oceans, flows through 
the rivers, falls from the sky whenever it rains, and so on, and the social 
concept of ice which is sensitive to the stuff found in glaciers, around the 
poles of the Earth (for now), falls from the sky as hail, and so on. Yet while 
perhaps once we thought that water and ice were different kinds of things, 
as a result of scientific investigations we have discovered that there is no 
deep metaphysical difference between water and ice: they are both H2O. 
So, we now believe there is only one natural kind concept, which both 
water and ice fall under. 
 
Surely, we should expect the same thing to occur in the case of free will: 
discovering some deep metaphysical fact that characterizes actions we 
currently judge to be unfree, to be shared with actions we judge to be free, 
gives us warrant to conclude that both sets of actions are of the same 
metaphysical kind, and that both are unfree. For example, if determinism 
is in fact true, and we judge that such a metaphysical fact makes actions 
unfree, then we should judge that none of our actions are free.3  
 
Thus, there seems to be a concept of free will that tracks some deep 
metaphysical feature of our actions. I will refer to the concept of free will 
that is relevantly similar to a natural kind concept, a metaphysical kind 
concept. 
 
The idea that free will might be a natural kind has been expressed in the 
free will literature before (Heller 1996; Deery 2019). Such a view is a 
natural extension of the paradigm-case view advanced by Antony Flew 
                                                 
3 Thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell for the Ice and Water case. 
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(1955), who suggested that the meaning of ‘free will’ is fixed by the 
paradigm cases.4 However, if it’s a conceptual constraint that something 
falls under the concept of free will only if that thing forms a natural kind, 
then the meaning of ‘free will’ is fixed by whatever natural kind is 
uniformly in common between all (and only) the paradigm cases.5  
 
One consequence of thinking of free will as a natural kind is that it admits 
a family of views which vary according to what you think is in common 
between all the paradigm cases. For instance, on the one hand, free will 
might form a metaphysical kind and so carve nature at its joints. This seems 
to be the case when we think that free will is whatever allows our actions 
to be indeterministic, whilst not being merely chancy. On the other hand, 
free will might form a psychological, functional or social kind. While these 
latter kinds do not carve nature at its joints, they nevertheless carve nature 
up in a useful fashion. Perhaps free will is a psychological capacity or suite 
of psychological capacities, or perhaps free will is just the practices 
themselves of judging certain actions to be free and unfree. Finally, and 
most permissively, free will might just be whatever is a member of the set 
of paradigm-cases. On this view free will could be anything at all. 
 
It is my view that we should treat this family of natural kind views as a 
kind of prioritized hierarchy.6 By that I mean that if the metaphysical kind 
is there and in common between the paradigm cases, then that’s what free 
will is and necessarily so. Else, if the psychological kind is there and in 
common between the paradigm cases, then that’s what free will is, and 
necessarily so, and so on. Then perhaps, finally, if there is no natural kind 
in common between the paradigm cases, then free will just is the paradigm 
cases. While I think that there is something in common between the 
paradigm cases I am not taking a stand in this paper on exactly what that 
is. Further, I am not advocating that it is possible for anything at all to count 
as free will which would seem to be the case if there is nothing at all in 
common between the paradigm cases, aside from being a member of the 
set of paradigm cases. While I think that it’s open for someone to think 
that, it is not my view.  
 
For the ease of ongoing discussion I will restrict myself to just the social 
and metaphysical kinds. Given these two apparent concepts of free will, 
                                                 
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for making me aware of this existing and growing 
literature. 
5 Though for arguments against the paradigm-case view and free will as a natural kind, see 
van Inwagen (1983) and Daw and Alter (2001). 
6 I will have much more to say about this kind of prioritized hierarchy when I come to 
discuss the idea of the folk concept of free will being a conditional concept with respect to 
determinism in §3. 
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there are two conceptual impossibility theses: one weak and one strong. 
The weak conceptual impossibility thesis is that the social concept of free 
will and the metaphysical concept of free will are both important. If some 
underlying metaphysical feature is missing (i.e. determinism is true) then 
on the metaphysical concept of free will, error theory will be true. 
However, according to the weak conceptual impossibility thesis the social 
concept of free will is also important, and on the social concept there will 
be free will regardless. The conceptual impossibility thesis is true of the 
social concept. The strong conceptual impossibility thesis is that while 
both the social concept and metaphysical concept exist, it’s only the social 
concept that matters, so the conceptual impossibility thesis is true of the 
concept that matters. Let me elaborate on both these theses.  
 
2.1. The Weak Conceptual Impossibility Thesis 
 
There are two apparent concepts of free will: a metaphysical concept which 
is open to the possibility that there is no free will (analogous to the 
discovery that since ice is just H2O, in some deep sense there is no ice) and 
a social concept according to which as long as there are differences 
between paradigm cases we judge to be free and paradigm cases we judge 
to be unfree, this guarantees there is free will. On the weak conceptual 
impossibility thesis, both concepts are needed, and the social concept is 
guaranteed to be satisfied. 
 
But what do I mean when I say both concepts are needed? Well the fact 
that water and ice are both H2O plays an important explanatory role in our 
best scientific theories; such as why ice and water exhibit the same 
chemical properties. So, there is an important sense in which there is not 
both water and ice, there is just H2O. Perhaps philosophers, too, will 
conclude that there’s no metaphysical difference between those cases that 
we ordinarily judge to be free, and those we judge to be unfree. However, 
aside from generating an apparent problem for free will, I am not sure what 
purpose we have for taxonomising our actions according to their deep 
metaphysical nature. For instance, what is gained by classifying our 
ordinary actions by the lights of determinism? I will return to this point 
shortly when I describe the strong impossibility thesis. I leave it open, here, 
that there could be good reasons for classifying our actions according to 
their metaphysical nature (i.e. determinism), and thus to in some sense 
collapse the distinction between free and unfree actions on the 
metaphysical concept. 
 
Even if we do so, however, there is clearly some relevant distinction 
between the actions we judge to be free, and those we judge to be unfree. 
To see this, return to the case of water and ice. Suppose we agree that there 
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is no metaphysical difference between water and ice, and hence that in 
some good sense we can collapse the distinction between them. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear sense in which despite this, there is both water 
and ice despite there being no metaphysical difference between them. 
That’s because we care about the role the superficial differences between 
water and ice plays in ordinary matters. If I am thirsty and ask for a glass 
of water at a restaurant, I would be amused to receive a glass filled with 
ice.  
 
Similarly, even if there is no deep metaphysical difference between actions 
we judge to be free, and to be unfree, we still care deeply about whether 
actions fall into one, or instead the other, category. We care whether or not 
we act for our reasons, in order to fulfil our desires, or after some process 
of deliberation as opposed to being bound-up, coerced and manipulated, or 
caught in the grips of a psychological or physiological illness. What this 
social concept of free will tracks then, is whatever it is which vindicates 
this difference. 
 
The weak conceptual impossibility thesis holds that the distinction 
between free and unfree actions is like the distinction between water and 
ice. Just as there are two ways of thinking about water and ice, there are 
two ways of thinking about free and unfree action. On the metaphysical 
concept, we group the cases according to their metaphysical nature, and so 
decide that there are no free actions if determinism is true. This is 
analogous to the sense in which there is not water and ice, there is only 
H2O. On the social concept we group the cases according to some, perhaps 
more superficial, difference between them, a difference that we care about 
for our ordinary purposes. This is analogous to the sense in which we 
ordinarily treat water and ice as distinct despite there being no 
metaphysical difference between them. That’s because what we are often 
just as, if not more, interested in, is the role such distinctions play in 
ordinary matters, and not their deep metaphysical nature. So, while error 
theory is true of our metaphysical concept of free will, the conceptual 
impossibility thesis is true of our social concept of free will. 
 
2.2. The Strong Conceptual Impossibility Thesis 
 
What of the strong conceptual impossibility thesis? According to that 
thesis, while there are two concepts of free will, only the social concept 
matters for any important purposes. In the water and ice case, the 
metaphysical concept on which despite superficial differences, both water 
and ice are H2O, plays an important role in our best scientific explanations 
in the chemical sciences. That’s why the metaphysical concept matters. But 
there seems to me to be nothing analogous in the case of free will that 
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justifies taking seriously the idea that just because something about every 
free action turns out to be like the unfree actions, that that feature is crucial 
for freedom. The strong conceptual impossibility thesis says that the free 
and unfree distinction is not like the distinction between water and ice 
because while we certainly care about the superficial differences between 
those actions we judge to be free and unfree, there’s nothing analogous to 
the chemical sciences which justifies taxonomising our ordinary actions 
according to deep metaphysical similarities. Error theory might be true on 
the metaphysical concept of free will, but no one ever cared about that 
concept because it doesn’t matter for any of the purposes for which we 
deploy that concept. So, on the only concept that matters, the social 
concept, the conceptual impossibility thesis is true. 
 
In the next section I will show how the conceptual impossibility thesis has 
important consequences for the interpretation of extant empirical work on 
our folk concept of free will and its relationship to the thesis of 
determinism. Then later, I will give some reasons to think that all factors 




3. Experimental Philosophy, Determinism and the Folk Concept of 
Free Will 
 
One metaphysical factor that many people have supposed matters for free 
will is determinism. The thesis of determinism holds that the entirety of 
particular facts about the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, 
entails every truth about the future. Is our concept of free will compatible 
with determinism being true? Compatibilists answer affirmatively. 
According to them, if determinism is true then provided agents have some 
preferred set of abilities, which vary according to the version of 
compatibilism at issue, then free actions are those produced by those 
abilities. For ease of explication I will refer to whatever the abilities are 
that when exercised in the production of an action makes that action free 
according to compatibilism: compatibilist powers. Conversely, 
incompatibilists take it to be a necessary condition for our having free will 
that indeterminism is true. Libertarians are incompatibilists who think 
there is free will. Call whatever the abilities are that when exercised in the 
production of an action makes that action free according to libertarianism: 
libertarian powers. 
 
If the conceptual impossibility thesis is true, then the folk concept of free 
will must be compatible with determinism. But, while it’s often been 
assumed that the folk concept of free will is an incompatibilist one, there 
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is excellent evidence from experimental philosophy that the folk concept 
is a compatibilist concept (e.g., Nahmias et al.  2005; 2006) and also that 
it is an incompatibilist concept (e.g., Nichols and Knobe 2007).  
 
How should we make sense of this apparent inconsistency? Roskies and 
Nichols (2008; though see also Björnsson 2014; Latham 2019) noticed a 
difference in the experimental materials used. While Nahmias and 
colleagues situated some of their determinism vignettes in the actual 
world, Nichols and colleagues situated them in hypothetical worlds. In 
order to confirm their suspicion that participants’ free will judgements to 
deterministic vignettes differed as a result of where they were being 
evaluated, participants were evenly split between considering deterministic 
vignettes in the actual world or in some other hypothetical world. 
Consistent with the authors’ hypotheses, where the deterministic scenario 
was situated significantly impacted participants’ free will judgements. 
Participants’ free will judgements were significantly higher when the 
deterministic vignette being evaluated was in our own world relative to 
when the deterministic vignette being evaluated was in some hypothetical 
world. 
 
3.1. Determinism and a Conditional Concept of Free Will  
 
Roskies and Nichols (following Braddon-Mitchell 2003; though see also 
Latham 2019) argued that these results suggest that the folk concept of free 
will takes a conditional form with respect to determinism. So: 
 
If the actual world is indeterministic, and agents have libertarian 
powers, then these libertarian powers are what free will is and must 
be. 
Else, if the actual world is deterministic, and agents have their 
preferred compatibilist powers, then compatibilist powers are what 
free will is. 
 
To make things even clearer, this conditional analysis of free will can be 
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  Possible World 
  I D 
Actual World 
I T F 
D T T 
  
‘Some agents have free will’ 
 
Figure 1. Two-dimensional diagram showing the conditional 
analysis of free will with respect to determinism, given the sentence 
‘some agents have free will’. 
 
 
Here is how to read the two-dimensional table: along the top we see two 
classes of worlds, indeterministic worlds (I) and deterministic worlds (D). 
Let’s suppose for ease of explication that all indeterministic worlds contain 
agents with libertarian powers and all deterministic worlds contain agents 
with compatibilist powers (this assumption can easily be removed with a 
much more complex diagram). These are ‘worlds considered as 
counterfactual’ relative to each other. Down the left-hand side, we see the 
same two classes of worlds, but here they are not thought of as 
counterfactual alternatives to each other, where one is actual and the other 
is an alternative. Instead, they are alternatives about how the actual world 
itself, for all we know a priori, might be. 
 
What we are doing when we read this table, is considering our judgments 
about whether or not some agents have free will, relative to different 
contexts (ways things might be, for all we know, only one of which is 
actual), from the perspective of different indices (ways the actual world 
might turn out to be). Suppose, then, that the actual world turns out to be 
indeterministic. From the index of an indeterministic actual world, if we 
look at counterfactual worlds that are also indeterministic then we will 
judge that it is true that some agents have free will. This is reflected in the 
T value in the world at the top left cell of our table. That world is being 
evaluated from the perspective of an actual indeterministic world 
(specified on the left of the table). The top right cell contains an F. There, 
we evaluate what to say about the truth-value of ‘some agents have free 
will’ at a deterministic world, from the perspective of an indeterministic 
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actual world. In that case, since we judge that those deterministic worlds 
do not contain agents with free will, that sentence comes out as false. 
 
On the other hand, suppose that the actual world turns out to be 
deterministic. Now consider our judgements about ‘some agents have free 
will’ at a deterministic counterfactual world (the cell on the bottom right). 
Since compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will, we will judge that 
the sentence is true in that counterfactual world. Furthermore, since having 
either compatibilist or libertarian powers is sufficient for having free will 
conditional on the actual world being deterministic, it follows that we will 
judge that in any worlds with those powers, regardless of whether they are 
deterministic or not, agents have free will. Hence ‘some agents have free 
will’ will be true when evaluated in counterfactual indeterministic worlds, 
conditional on the actual world being deterministic. This is reflected in the 
bottom left cell of the table. 
 
Let’s tie this back to the empirical results. When a vignette is taken to 
describe the actual world, we should expect that if people deploy a 
conditional concept, they will judge that agents are free in the deterministic 
world considered as actual, and will judge that agents are unfree in the 
counterfactual deterministic world. People are inclined to judge that people 
in the counterfactual deterministic world are unfree, because people in fact 
believe that the actual world is indeterministic and so think, unless told 
otherwise, that indeterminism is a necessary condition for free will.7 So, 
far so good; but this evidence is only consistent with the folk having a 
conditional concept of free will with respect to determinism. The reason 
these results do not show that people in fact possess a conditional concept 
of free will is because we do not have data and responses to all the 
conditions necessary to determine whether or not there is a conditional 
concept.  
 
Recently, Latham (2019) tested more directly whether or not the folk 
concept of free will is a conditional one with respect to determinism. They 
noted that the conditional account makes two key predictions regarding 
people’s free will judgments to various conditions, which they called the 
weak and strong signal for conditionality. The weak signal for 
conditionality is what Roskies and Nichols (2008) identified might be 
present in their data. Given that people tend to believe the actual world is 
                                                 
7 As a descriptive matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of ordinary people think that 
the actual world is indeterministic. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) found over 
90% of participants chose the vignette describing an indeterministic universe, not a 
deterministic universe, as being most like the actual world. Similarly, Latham (2019) found 
81.6% of participants selected the indeterministic universe as being most like the actual 
universe. 
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indeterministic, if they possess a conditional concept and are asked to 
evaluate the actual deterministic world, they should be expected to respond 
that there is free will in such a world. That’s because according to the 
conditional concept, indeterministic and libertarian powers are only 
necessary for free will if they obtain actually. The strong signal for 
conditionality was more novel. For the minority of people who believe the 
actual world is deterministic, if they possess a conditional concept and are 
asked to evaluate a counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective 
of an actual indeterministic world, they should be expected to respond that 
there is no free will in that world. That’s because according to the 
conditional concept, indeterminism and libertarian powers are necessary 
for free will if the actual world is indeterministic. 
 
Latham (2019) found that people who believe the actual world is 
indeterministic respond that there is free will in an indeterministic actual 
world and a counterfactual indeterministic world from the perspective of a 
deterministic actual world. Further, they respond that there is no free will 
in a counterfactual deterministic world. Interestingly though, people who 
believe the actual world is indeterministic are unsure whether or not there 
is free will in the deterministic actual world (the weak signal for 
conditionality). People who believe the actual world is deterministic 
respond that there is free will in the deterministic actual world, the 
indeterministic actual world, and counterfactual indeterministic actual 
world from the perspective of a deterministic actual world. Again, 
interestingly, people who believe the actual world is deterministic are 
unsure whether or not there is free will in the counterfactual deterministic 
world, from the perspective of an indeterministic world (the strong signal 
for conditionality). 
 
While people don’t straightforwardly respond in a manner predicted by the 
conditional concept, they do respond in a manner that supports the idea 
that we possess a conditional concept with respect to determinism. That’s 
because I don’t think it is mere coincidence that people who believe the 
actual world is indeterministic are unsure how to respond to an actual 
deterministic world. Nor do I think it’s a coincidence that people who 
believe the actual world is deterministic are unsure how to respond to a 
counterfactual deterministic world from the perspective of an actual 
indeterministic world. Both these conditions are correctly identified as 
being important with respect to people’s concept of free will once it has 
been identified that our concept of free will might be a conditional concept 
with respect to determinism. 
 
Why are people unsure how to respond in conditions associated with the 
weak and strong signal for conditionality? Let’s start with the weak signal 
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for conditionality. Imagine someone believes the actual world is 
indeterministic and is then asked to evaluate whether there is free will in 
the actual deterministic world. It’s extremely unlikely that people change 
their beliefs about the actual world in order to perform such evaluations. 
Instead, what people most likely do is simulate how they would respond if 
they counterfactually believed the actual world is deterministic. 
Importantly, this cognitive process does not mask the effects of what 
people actually believe, which is what explains why people are unsure 
about how to respond. If someone has a conditional concept and believes 
the actual world is indeterministic, then they should also think that 
indeterminism and libertarian powers are necessary for free will. So 
according to their actual belief there is no free will in the deterministic 
actual world. But if they succeed in simulating what they would think if 
they counterfactually believed the actual world is deterministic, then they 
should also think compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. So 
according to their simulated counterfactual belief there is free will in the 
actual deterministic world. Thus, there is a response conflict between their 
responses generated in accordance with their actual belief, and their 
simulated counterfactual belief. 
 
This also explains why we observe that people who believe the actual 
world is deterministic are unsure how to respond in the condition 
associated with the strong signal for conditionality. Imagine now someone 
who believes the actual world is deterministic and is asked to evaluate 
whether there is free will in a counterfactual deterministic world from the 
perspective of an indeterministic actual world. If that person has a 
conditional concept with respect to determinism, then they should also 
think that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. So according to 
their actual belief there is free will in the counterfactual deterministic 
world. But if they succeed in simulating what they would think if they 
counterfactually believed the actual world is indeterministic, then they 
should no longer think that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. 
Instead they should think that indeterminism and libertarian powers are 
necessary for free will. So according to their simulated counterfactual 
belief there is no free will in the counterfactual deterministic world. As a 
result, there is a conflict between free will responses that are generated in 
accordance with someone’s actual and simulated counterfactual beliefs. 
 
3.2. Determinism and the Conceptual Impossibility Thesis  
 
If the folk concept of free will is a conditional concept with respect to 
determinism, then the conceptual impossibility thesis too, at least with 
respect to determinism, is correct. That’s because no matter how things 
turn out actually to be—with respect to the world being deterministic or 
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not—if we possess that concept, we will judge that we possess free will. 
Once you hold fixed the compatibilist powers and libertarian powers in all 
these worlds, all worlds considered as ways things might actually be 
contain agents with free will. So even if determinism is actually true, and 
we only possess compatibilist powers, we will judge that we are free. On 
the other hand, if indeterminism is actually true, and we possess libertarian 
powers, we will judge that we are free, and that indeterminism and 
libertarian powers are necessary for free will. 
  
This means there is something we could discover, if the conditional story 
is correct, which would make us think that indeterminism and libertarian 
powers are necessary. But that doesn’t mean that the conditional concept 
of free will is inconsistent with the conceptual impossibility thesis, because 
there is nothing we could discover about how things are actually that would 
make us judge that actually there’s no free will. Remember, we’re holding 
fixed here that there are actually either compatibilist or libertarian powers. 
So, my claim is just that nothing we could discover about determinism 
would lead us to judge that we are unfree. As I suggested earlier, I think 
the conceptual impossibility thesis generalizes beyond determinism, but I 
have no empirical data that can support that contention here. Still in the 
next section (§4) I will give some good reasons why I think we should 
expect this.   
 
So, with regard to the world being deterministic or not, free will is 
compatible with anything that we could discover about how things actually 
are. But if that’s right then how did we become convinced that the folk 
concept of free will is an incompatibilist one? The conditional analysis 
offers up a ready explanation. If people think that the actual world is 
indeterministic and contains agents with libertarian powers, then they will 
judge not only that we are free, but also that deterministic possible worlds 
containing only agents with compatibilist powers lack free will (see 
footnote 7). So to the extent people are confident that actually, the world 
is indeterministic and there are libertarian powers, they should be expected 
to deny that compatibilist powers are sufficient for free will. From the 
perspective of a world where indeterminism is true, some, but not all, 
counterfactual worlds will contain agents with free will. 
 
Of course, in most of the free will literature the distinction between judging 
of the actual world that it is deterministic and that indeterminism is a 
necessary condition for free will, and judging of the actual world that it is 
indeterministic, and that indeterminism is a necessary condition for free 
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will, is not made.8 What actual philosophers of free will, embedded and 
entrenched in their philosophical views, would judge when this distinction 
is drawn is not something about which we have empirical data. 
Nevertheless, I think this distinction makes a difference to the judgments 
of ordinary agents. 
 
 
4. Conditionality and the Conceptual Impossibility Thesis  
 
In the previous section I provided evidence that the folk concept of free 
will is conditional with respect to determinism. This results in our 
judgments about whether or not we typically possess free will being 
insensitive to whether determinism is actually true. Instead, the truth or 
otherwise of determinism only affects our counterfactual judgments about 
whether agents in other worlds have free will. One way to think of the 
conceptual impossibility thesis is as a generalization of this.  
 
So far, I have talked about whether determinism is true or false simpliciter. 
But it’s important to also consider potential defeaters of free will (of which 
determinism is just one) in another way: the local way. How might we react 
if we were to learn that it is sometimes, somewhere true. While in fact in 
the case of determinism it is plausible that it’s either globally true, or else 
false, when we generalize from determinism to other factors people might 
have thought important for free will, this may not be so. 
 
Our judgments about whether we typically have free will are insensitive to 
various apparent defeaters to our free will being true in general. Imagine 
for the moment your favorite free will defeater X. If there is no global X, 
then having X rules out counterfactual populations from being free (and 
perhaps niche local populations as well). But if in fact X is generally 
actually true, then it doesn’t affect our judgments about counterfactual 
populations. The presence or absence of X does not affect out judgements 
about whether actually we are free at all.  
 
Let’s work through a couple of examples. Imagine how the account I am 
offering might deal with another important challenge to free will. If what 
some brain scientists think is correct, then conscious psychological states 
do not perform the role we suppose they do for our actions (e.g., Libet et 
                                                 
8 To the best of my knowledge Peter Van Inwagen (1983) is the only theorist who appears 
to identify this distinction and thinks that the actual world is indeterministic and that this 
indeterminism is necessary for free will. In the very last paragraph of his book An Essay on 
Free Will, he writes “…it is conceivable that science will one day present us with 
compelling reasons for believing in determinism. Then, and only then, I think should we 
become compatibilists.” (p. 223) 
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al. 1983; Soon et al. 2008). Instead, conscious psychological states, and the 
actions that we suppose they cause, are both caused by an unconscious 
common cause. Let’s call worlds where all actions are like these brain 
scientists think: Libet worlds. On the account I have been describing, if the 
actual world is one where conscious processes are causally involved in 
typical decisions, then we might think that is necessary for free will. But if 
actually they are not—if our world is a Libet world—then we will say that 
so long as the typical neural common cause of the action and its 
accompanying conscious state is in place, then the resultant action is free. 
 
We can also imagine an even more extreme case (even by the lights of the 
free will literature). Imagine everyone’s actions everywhere are being 
controlled by an alien species called Dromes. These Dromes have total 
control over both our conscious and unconscious psychological states, and 
thus our actions as well. For ease of explication, let’s call worlds where all 
actions are controlled by Dromes: Drome worlds. On the account I have 
been describing, if the actual world is a Drome world, then we would still 
have free will, since free will is just whatever we are tracking that that 
distinguishes the cases we ordinarily judge to be free and the cases we 
ordinarily judge to be unfree. But if the actual world is not a Drome world, 
as is commonly supposed, then only those actions that are not the result of 
Drome control will be free, and necessarily so.9 
 
Of course, we can be almost certain that free will error theory would be 
true of our metaphysical concept of free will if the actual world is either a 
Libet or Drome World. Still, despite there being no deep metaphysical 
difference between the cases we judge to be free and unfree, I think that 
we can be expected to want our actions to be like the ones that we 
ordinarily think of as free. Even if, with respect to some particular 
metaphysical matter of fact, there is no difference between these actions, 
there are relevant differences that our social concept of free will tracks with 
our talk of free and unfree action. It also seems that we can be expected to 
normatively evaluate actions, and to do that we need to distinguish actions 
that are performed while being, (what we might have ordinarily of thought 
of as), coerced and manipulated, from those that are not, and actions 
performed while being in the grips of, (what we might have ordinarily of 
thought was), a psychological or physiological illness, from those that are 
not, and so on. Regardless of whether all our actions are the result of 
unconscious processes, Dromes, mutatis mutandis for all these kinds of 
                                                 
9 You might think that it’s consistent with us making the discovery that we have no free 
will that our free will practices would persist, albeit as a useful fiction. However, on the 
view that I am advancing here, if the free will practices are what is in common between 
paradigm cases, then free will just is realism about the practices, and so we do have free 
will. 
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cases, we still care that our actions be like the ones that we would ordinarily 
think of as being free. If that’s right, then the conceptual impossibility 
thesis is true of our social concept of free will. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error 
Theory 
 
In this paper I have argued for the conceptual impossibility of free will 
error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. There are two apparent 
concepts of free will: a metaphysical concept that tracks some 
metaphysical feature of our actions, and a social concept that tracks 
relevant differences between actions we ordinarily judge to be free and 
unfree. The weak conceptual impossibility thesis is that while free will 
error theory might be true on the metaphysical concept, there will be free 
will regardless, on the social concept. That’s because our social concept of 
free will cannot do the job it’s supposed to, and that concept fail to be 
satisfied. So, the conceptual impossibility thesis is true of that concept. The 
strong conceptual impossibility thesis is that while both concepts exist, 
only the social concept matters, and so the conceptual impossibility thesis 
is true of the only concept of free will we care about. 
 
The conceptual impossibility thesis not only makes good sense of our 
practices—that we continue to hold people responsible for some actions, 
and not others, regardless of whether we think that our world is 
deterministic, and regardless of whether we think that certain 
neuroscientific findings hold—and it helps us make sense of some 
inconsistent findings in the experimental philosophy literature examining 
our concept of free will. This, jointly, gives us some reason to think that 
the conceptual impossibility thesis is correct, and that there is no way the 
actual world could be such that we judge that we do not have free will: on 
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